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National restrictions of freedom of speech on the nascent global in-
formation infrastructure are commonplace not only in the United States,
but also around the globe.' Individual nations, each intent upon pre-
serving what they perceive to be within the perimeters of their national
interests, seek to regulate certain forms of speech because of content
that is considered reprehensible or offensive to national well-being or
civic virtue.2 The fact that this offending speech is technologically dis-
persed instantaneously to millions of potential recipients strengthens the
impetus to regulate.
At the same time, outspoken free speech advocates vigorously assert
an absolutist position of non-regulation, in what appears to be an unre-
lenting struggle for every inch of unregulated information infrastructure
* Austrian Legal Policy Institute. Professor Mayer-Schnberger received his Mag.jur
and Dr.jur. from Salzburg, an LL.M. from Harvard, and a MSc (LSE). He led the Informa-
tion Law Project at the Austrian Legal Policy Institute from 1993 to 1995 and is currently
with the University of Vienna Faculty of Law.
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1. C.T. Mien. "Steps Taken in Other Countries to Regulate the Internet," The Straits
Times (Singapore), March 9, 1996, p. 35. In Austria, a broad study on the subject of regulat-
ig the information infrastructure was commissioned by the Federal government. Ursula Maier-
Rabler, Viktor Mayer-Schnberger, Gabriele Schmlzer, Georg Nening-Sch6fbdnker. Net With-
out Qualities. 1995, http://www.komdat.sbg.ac.at/nikt. For the restricting effect on speech
through a European Union Directive on Data Protection, see Stewart Baker. "The Net Es-
cape? Ha!," Wired, Sept., 1995, p. 125. In the United States, the Communication Decency
Act of 1996, outlaws distribution over the interet of material from child pornography to
profanity. 47 U.S.C. ' 609 et seq. (1996).
2. See THOMAS L. PANGLE, THE SPIRIT OF MODERN REPUBLICANISM: THE MORAL VI-
SION OF THE AMERICAN FOUNDERS AND THE PHILOSOPHY OF LOCKE (1988); MICHAEL J.
SANDEL, LIBERALISM AND THE LIMITS OF JUSTICE 59-65, 147-74 (1982); J.G.A. POCOCK,
THE MACHIAVELLIAN MOMENT: FLORENTINE POLITICAL THOUGHT AND THE ATLANTIC
REPUBLICAN TRADITION (1975); Symposium, The Republican Civic Tradition, 97 YALE L.J.
1493 (1988).
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territory This information infrastructure is a communicative device of
such broad scope and accessibility that it is of paramount importance to
free speech absolutists, who characterize it as a tool for democratizing
speech on a global basis and insist that it remain insulated from any
regulatory mandates.
Activists at both ends of the spectrum disregard an integral aspect of
the global composition of the Net. Those who advocate unfettered Net
communication and those who espouse some form of national Net
regulation are similarly constrained in the pursuit of their objectives by
the very structure of the information infrastructure. It is the global as-
pect of the information infrastructure that shapes the debate on freedom
of speech and limits absolutists and regulators at the same time.
The nature of this conflict and its potential resolution will be out-
lined in this Article.4 Therefore, assuming that national policy makers
will not want to cede their authority to regulate the information infra-
structure, we will suggest a mechanism by which those who elect to
regulate speech can begin to deliberate about this objective in a struc-
tured, principled, and internationally acceptable manner.
I. INTERNATIONAL CONSTRAINTS ON NATIONAL
INFORMATION INFRASTRUCTURES
The international nature of the information infrastructure places
substantial constraints upon both the free speech absolutists and those
who would regulate speech.
A. Restraint by Nations on Domestic Speech
Advocates of an unobstructed flow of speech conceive of the Net as
(1) an anarchic communicative medium that is an inappropriate area for
governmental regulatory intrusion, and (2) a medium capable of
advancing freedom on a global scale by razing barriers to accessing
information, even in closed societies. In the United States, these free
3. Howard Rheingold. "Why Censoring Cyberspace Is Futile," Computer Under-
ground Digest 6.40 (1995).
4. The debate concerning the prudence and legitimacy of content-based speech regula-
tion is beyond the scope of this paper. For an analysis of the contention that some forms of
speech are so horrifying and potentially destructive that they can be regulated, and a pro-
posal for the nature and structure of that regulation, see Viktor Mayer-Schiinberger and
Teree E. Foster, More Speech, Less Noise: Amplifying Content-Based Speech Regulations
Through Binding International Law, 18 B.C. INT'L & CoM. L. Rnv. 59 (1995).
5. Donald E. Lively, The Information Superhighway: A First Amendment Roadmap, 35
B.C.L. Rev. 1067 (1994); Note, The Message Is the Medium: The First Amendment on the
Information Superhighway, 107 HAv. L. Rav. 1062 (1994).
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speech advocates rely on the words of the First Amendment, which is
framed in absolute terms, and on the Supreme Court, which has
occasionally endorsed an absolutist interpretation of the Amendment's
dictates.6
But speech is not-and never has been-inviolate, neither in the
United States nor in any other country. In fact, restrictions abound.
Communicative acts on the Net are within national speech restric-
tions, as the Net is not extraterritorial and its users are not otherwise
exempted from existing national speech regulations. In fact, many na-
tions have begun the process of constricting the content of speech on the
Net. The following discussion samples the regulatory rules currently in
force around the world.
Libel. Most nations deal severely with speech that denigrates an-
other's reputation. Many national libel laws apply directly to Net
communication.7
Pornography. In England, the Obscene Publications Act defines
"obscene" as material that "tends to deprave and corrupt persons,"
making such material subject to regulation. Penthouse magazine's
World Wide Web site lists 25 countries that outlaw its so-called "adult
material," among which are Egypt, India, Japan, Korea, Mexico, Saudi
Arabia, Spain and the United Kingdom. The government of Singapore
has recently implemented a licensing scheme for all local Internet op-
erators and content providers that is designed to constrain all forms of
sexual excesses in cyberspace. And discussions of sex-as well as re-
ligion and politics-are banned in Saudi Arabia and Iran."
In Germany, a group of laws designed to protect children was en-
forced recently in a now-infamous case involving CompuServe. In
November 1995, a Bavarian State Attorney ordered a search of the
6. See, e.g., R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377 (1992); Texas v. Johnson, 491
U.S. 397 (1989); Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15 (1971); Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S.
444 (1969); New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964); Yates v. United States,
354 U.S. 298 (1957).
7. Ulrich Sieber. "Strafrechtliche Verantwortlichkeit fhr den Datenverkehr in Interna-
tionalen Computernetzen," Juristenzeitung 1996:429-42; Sunday Times v. United Kingdom,
2 E.H.R.R. 245 (1979). More recently in England, a physics lecturer and a nuclear physicist
brought separate actions against former colleagues, each alleging that defamatory remarks
about his professional competence had been disseminated on Usenet. "Electronic War of
Words in Cyberspace Is Heading for Very Real Confrontation in a UK Courtroom," The
Financial Times, August 13, 1994, at 24.
8. Mitch Betts & Gary H. Anthes, On-Line Boundaries Unclear: Internet Tramples
Legal Jurisdictions, COMPUTERWORLD, June 5, 1995, at 1, 16.
9. "Lee Kuan Says Yes to Internet, No to Sex and Violence on TV," Agence France
Presse, Oct. 6, 1995. C.T. Mien, 1996, p. 35.
10. Faiza S. Ambah, An Intruder in the Kingdom, Bus. WEEK, Aug. 21, 1995, at 40;
Carole Bogert, Chat Rooms and Chadors, NEWSWEEK, Aug. 21, 1995, at 36.
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Munich office of CompuServe for evidence of a breach of German child
pornography laws, and material was seized by police. The prosecutor
pressed CompuServe to prevent all users from accessing through its In-
ternet gateway certain Unsenet newsgroups allegedly disseminating
child pornography. In December, CompuServe complied and prevented
its users from accessing 200 sites, including all those prefixed with
"alt.sex." CompuServe later lifted this ban in the wake of substantial
world wide protest."1 By then, CompuServe had developed a software
solution to block certain Internet information resources.
Subversive Infonnation. Computer equipment of anarchist groups
that advocate anti-government violence through utilization of online
sources has been seized by the governments of Italy, England, and
Scotland. Vietnam, concerned that increasing links with noncommunist
nations could undermine the ruling regime, is seeking to control Internet
access on the country's two independent computer networks. 2
Hate Speech. As might be anticipated, the most virulent laws crimi-
nalizing hate speech are found in those countries scarred by the
Holocaust. In Germany, a number of provisions of the criminal code are
directed at expression that is inconsistent with the "dignity of the human
personality developing freely within the social community,"' 3 the fun-
damental right preserved in the German Constitution."4 For example,
Section 130 of the Criminal Code condemns attacks on human dignity
that incite hatred. Section 131 of that same Code proscribes the produc-
tion or dissemination of hate speech in written form.'5 Section 194
permits prosecution for the denial of the existence of the Holocaust
where the disavowal is stated to a person who is a member of a group
11. "Censorship Issues on the Internet Continue to Confuse Governments," New Media
Age, January 12, 1996, p. 5; "Sex on the Internet," The Economist, January 6, 1996, p. 18, where
the author inquires, "[w]hen Bavaria wrinkles its nose, must the whole world catch a cold?" See
generally Ulrich Sieber, Straffechtliche Verantwortlichkeit fuer den Datenverkehr in intema-
tionalen Computernetzen, JZ 429 (1996), <http://www.jura.uniwuerzburg.dellst/sieber/stvipdtl
svi0l/htm>.
12. "Scotland and Italy Crack Down on Anarchy Files," <http://www.eff.org/pub/Legal/
Cases/ BITS-A-t-ESpunkeff-raids.article>. Adrian Levy and Ian Burrell. "Anarchists Use
Computer Highway for Subversion," British Sunday Times, March 5, 1995 (England and Scot-
land); <http://www.eff.org/pub/Legal Cases/BITS-A-t-ESpunkbitsseizure.article (Italy)>;
"Cyber Notes," The Christian Science Monitor, Sept. 21, 1995, p. 11.
13. The Liith Case, Judgment of Jan. 15, 1958, Federal Constitutional Court, 7
BVeffGE 198, translated in Donald P. Kommers. The Constitutional Jurisprudence of the
Federal Republic of Germany. (Durham, N.C.: Duke University Press), 1989, p. 370.
14. Grundgesetz {German Basic Law) Article 1.
15. Outlawed are writings that "incite to race hatred or which describe cruel or other in-
human acts of violence against human beings in a manner expressing glorification or
intentional minimization of such acts of violence or demonstrating the cruel or inhuman acts
in a manner injuring human dignity...." Strafgesetzbuch [German Penal Code) {StGB)
130, 131.
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persecuted by the Nazi regime. Section 86 forbids the distribution of
propaganda that promotes (1) the precepts of the Nazi regime, (2) un-
constitutional parties, or (3) prohibited associations. And Section 86(a)
censures the use of insignia-including flags, uniforms, badges and sa-r " n16
lutes-of these same proscribed organizations.
The means of enforcing these laws outlawing hate speech and Nazi
propaganda are currently the subject of vigorous debate in Germany.
German prosecutors in Mannheim are investigating CompuServe, the T-
Online network of Deutsche Telekom, and America Online for aiding
the Internet distribution of neo-Nazi material that questions whether the
Holocaust occurred.
7
In Austria, the Austrian Prohibition Act similarly prohibits actions
on behalf of the Nazi Party, as well as advocacy of its objectives or dis-
semination of its propaganda. Targeting groups of persons for ignominy
or advocating their genocide is likewise forbidden. 8 A special investi-
gation of the Austrian Police into terrorist activities has focused in
recent months on the Internet and a Nazi computer network information
exchange, known as Thule-Net."
In Canada, separate provisions of the Criminal Code criminalize the
willful promotion of hatred'0 and the communication of telephone mes-
sages likely to expose people to hatred or contempt because of, among
other things, their race, national or ethnic origin, color, or religion.2
16. In December, 1992, the German government banned the sale and distribution of
neo-Nazi rock music advocating violence and death to foreigners to youths under the age of
eighteen. By this measure the German government sought to staunch the precipitous rise of
right-wing violence. Strafgesetzbuch (Penal Code) {StGB} 194, 86, 86a. "Recent Develop-
ments," Harvard International Law Journal 34:563 (1993).
17. German Research and Technology Minister Juergen Ruettgers stated affirmed that
Bonn respected free speech, but declared that the German government must do more to
regulate the Internet. He stated that "[w]e cannot tolerate a situation in which anything goes"
and suggested that the Group of Seven leading industrial countries take up the issue.
"America Online Faces Probe over Alleged Nazi Material on Internet," The Jerusalem Post,
Feb. 4, 1996, p. 2; "CompuServe Still Blocks Access to Internet," The Reuter European
Community Report, Feb. 16, 1996. W. Boston, "Germans' Internet Crackdown A Sign of the
Future," Reuters, Feb.4, 1996. Sieber, 1966, p. 429-42.
18. Verbotsgesetz (Austrian Prohibition Act} ' 3.
19. Burkhard Schr6der. Neonazis und Computernetze. (Reinbek: Rowohlt), 1995, p. 41.
20. Criminal Code, R.S.C. 1985, ch. C46 ' 319(2). See R. v. Keegstra, [1990] 3 S.C.R.
697 (Can.), wherein the statute was upheld in a case involving a teacher charged with willful
promotion of hatred against an identifiable group for promoting anti-Semitism to his students
and penalizing the grades of those who did not respond favorably to his ranting. See also R.
v. Andrews, [1990] 3 S.C.R. 870 (Can.).See generally, Michel Racicot, Mark S. Hayes, Alec
R. Szibbo, Pierre Trudel, The Cyberspace is Not a 'No Law Land', Industry Canada (1997).
21. S.C. 1976-77, ch. 33, ' 13(1). This statute was upheld in Canada (Human Rights
Commission) v. Taylor, [1990] 3 S.C.R. 892 Can.). It is not yet clear whether these provi-
sions apply to electronic communications.
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Privacy Protection. Recently, the European Union decided to regu-
late the flow of information about individuals, ostensibly to prevent
corporate intrusion upon individual privacy. The member nations have
agreed to obstruct the export of personal data to nations that do not es-
tablish "adequate" privacy protection.22
These are just a few examples of the many national regulations of
Net speech in place throughout the world. Even liberal and democratic
Western countries seem to consistently restrict freedom of expression.
The Net is not an anarchic, unregulated dominion above and beyond
individual state control, but rather a terrain policed by varied, numerous,
and often contradictory national laws that create a variety of regulatory
fiefdoms. Yet, the internationality of the Net, as well as the conglom-
eration of national regulations and their effects on the flow of
information on the Net, invariably shapes all communicative activity on
it as a whole. Thus, the international aspect of the Net does not remove
discussions on the Net from national regulations, but instead subjects
them to panoply of varying and contradictory regulations that breed un-
certainty. The consequence is that speech, subjected to a patchwork of
constraints, might be restricted more than is intended or necessary.23 In
this respect, the global dimension of the Net could develop into more of
a liability than a speech-protecting asset, for this state of affairs gener-
ates subtle silencing and chilling of speech, rather than clear-cut
regulations.
Speech is, of course, also regulated in the United States. The United
States Supreme Court has identified varieties of vulnerable expression,
or "low value speech,"--forms of expression that "are no essential part
of any exposition of ideas, and are of such slight social value as a step to
truth that any benefit that may be derived from them is clearly outweighed
by the social interest in order and morality."'24 Low value speech includes
22. See generally A. Michael Froomkin, Anonymity and Its Enmities, 1995 J. ONLINE
L., <http://www.wm.edu/law/publications/jol/froomldn.html>. An issue concomitant to pri-
vacy concerns is the right to maintain anonymous communication on the Net. Whether a
right to anonymous speech does---or should-exist is beyond the scope of this paper. For
conflicting views, compare Tom W. Bell. "Anonymous Speech," Wired, Oct., 1995, p. 80
with Richard P. Klaus and Erik J. Heels. "Online," Student Lawyer, Sept., 1995, p. 33-36.
23. See Rohan Samarajiva, Cybercontent Regulation: From Proximate-Community
Standards to Virtual-Community Standards?, The Virtual Institute of Information, (last vis-
ited April 14, 1997) <http:llwww.ctr.columbia.edu/vi/papers/citirs.htm>.
24. Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 572 (1942); see also Geoffrey R.
Stone, Content Regulation and the First Amendment, 25 WM. & MARY L. Rnv. 189, 194
(1983).
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intentional incitement,2 obscenity,26 child pornography,27 defamation,'
fighting words,29 and commercial speech."0 The Court has enunciated a
series of quite different standards for each of these varieties of speech to
determine, first, whether a particular communication is protected or falls
25. See Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494, 544-46 (1951)(Frankfurter, J., concur-
ring). See also Brandenburg, 395 U.S. at 447-48 (1969)
26. See Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 20-35 (1973).
27. See New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747,754-64 (1982).
28. See Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 340 (1974). Cf. Henry v. Collins,
380 U.S. 356 (1965) and New York Times, 376 U.S. at 265 (both holding that defamatory
content is not sufficient to remove First Amendment protection). See generally, Joel D. Ea-
ton, The American Law of Defamation Through Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc. and Beyond: An
Analytical Primer, 61 VA. L. REv. 1349 (1975); Melville B. Nimmer, The Right to Speak
From Times to Time: First Amendment Theory Applied to Libel and Misapplied to Privacy,
56 CAL. L. REv. 935 (1968); Harry Kalven, Jr., The New York Times Case: A Note on the
Central Meaning of the First Amendment, 1964 Sup. CT. Rnv. 191 (1964);.
29. Fighting words are not inherently menacing in a constitutional sense, but become so
only when such words "by their very utterance inflict injury or tend to incite a breach of the
peace." Chaplinsky, 315 U.S. at 572. See also R.A.V., 505 U.S. at 382-85. Chaplinsky and
its fighting words doctrine, similar to obscenity and defamation, seems to raise many more
questions than it answers. For example, Chaplinsky addressed his epithets "God damned
racketeer" and "Fascist" to a city marshall who had interrupted Chaplinsky's soap box
speech. Chaplinsky, 314 U.S. at 569. Why should this outburst not be construed as a cry of
frustration at the overweening power of government, and therefore as protected political or
civic speech? Martin H. Redish, The Value of Free Speech, 130 U. PA. L. Rav. 591, 626
(1982). What of the emotive content of protected First Amendment speech? See Cohen, 403
U.S. at 18 (finding that state lacks power to censure underlying content of a "fighting words"
message). Could Chaplinsky be convicted for uttering fighting words had he written the
same phrases on a poster that he carried while walking the public streets? It has been sug-
gested that the fighting words doctrine's distinction between suppressible rough language
and protected provocative words-both of which might stir a listener to anger-operates
more to repress "low value" speakers than "low value" speech. Stanley Ingber, The Market-
place of Ideas: A Legitimizing Myth, 1984 DuKE L.J. 1, 33-34.
It is interesting that since Chaplinsky, no conviction for uttering fighting words has been
sustained by the Court. See, e.g., Plummer v. City of Columbus, 414 U.S. 2 (1973); Brown v.
Oklahoma, 408 U.S. 914 (1972); Lewis v. New Orleans, 408 U.S. 913 (1972); Gooding v.
Wilson, 405 U.S. 518 (1972). Yet, the fighting words doctrine retains technical validity. See
R.A.V., 505 U.S. 377. A number of commentators have criticized the continuing constitu-
tional validity of Chaplinsky, and called for its modification or elimination. See Toni M.
Massaro. Equality and Freedom of Expression: The Hate Speech Dilemma, 32 WMi. & MARY
L. REv. 211 (1991); Kent Greenawalt, Insults and Epithets: Are They Protected Speech?, 42
RUTGERs L. REv. 287 (1990); Note, The Demise of the Chaplinsky Fighting Words Doctrine:
An Argument for Its Interment, 106 HARv. L. REv. 1129 (1993).
30. Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, 425 U.S.
728 (1976). Commercial speech was once utterly vulnerable to regulation. See Valentine v.
Chrestensen, 316 U.S. 52 (1942). However, the Burger Court, and now the Rehnquist Court,
have enhanced the respectability afforded to speech that proposes a commercial transaction.
Unlike the aforelisted categories of vulnerable speech, the validity of commercial speech is
assessed by means of a balancing test not unlike that used by the Court to evaluate incidental
regulations on otherwise protected communication. Posadas De Puerto Rico Assocs. v.
Tourism Co. of Puerto Rico, 478 U.S. 328 (1986); Central Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v.
Public Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 557 (1980).
52 Michigan Telecommunications and Technology Law Review [Vol. 3:45
into a vulnerable category; and second, if vulnerable, whether any First
Amendment protection is merited.
Obscenity and Related Areas. Obscenity, perhaps the quintessential
example of valueless expression, is considered bereft of communicative
value, and thus subject to broad controls. The Court's latest formulation
for distinguishing obscenity from speech that is merely distasteful,
rough, evocative, or erotic-and therefore protected to some extent-
requires a finding that the communication is patently offensive, appeals
to prurient interests, and is bereft of serious scientific, artistic, literary,
or political value." Integral to these defining principles is the notion that
individual communities retain the authority to set their own statutory
standards for the definition of pornography, or communications that are
"patently offensive" and appeal to "prurient interests. 32
However, traditional notions of "community" quickly become
confounded in the context of a medium such as the Internet, the
characteristics of which obliterate any notions of state or national
boundaries. For example, a California couple was convicted in 1994 for
dispatching over computer bulletin board materials found to be obscene
when viewed in Memphis.33 The materials at issue in this case were
arguably obscene by any community standard.4 But this case and others
like it raise the question of whether using the Internet to transmit
31. Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49 (1973); Miller v. California, 413 U.S.
15 (1973). In Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 484 (1957), Justice Brennan opined:
The protection given speech and press was fashioned to assure unfettered inter-
change of ideas for the bringing about of political and social changes desired by
the people .... But implicit in the history of the First Amendment is the rejection
of obscenity as utterly without redeeming social importance.
Another justification for categorizing obscene speech as taboo is offered by Professor
Schauer-that obscenity is specifically designed to evoke a entirely physical effect, and thus
is a physical, and not a mental, stimulus. "[A] pornographic item is in a real sense a sexual
surrogate." Fred C. Schauer, Speech and "Speech"-Obscenity and "Obscenity": An Exer-
cise in the Interpretation of Constitutional Language, 67 GA. L. REv. 899, 922-23, 926
(1979).
32. Child pornography is a special case. Materials depicting children in sexual poses or
activities can be criminalized, even if the same materials depicting adults would pass First
Amendment muster. New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 756, 773 (1982). Moreover, mere
possession of child pornography, even in the privacy of one's own home, can be criminal-
ized, despite the contrary holding of Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557 (1969), concerning
possession of adult pornography. Osborne v. Ohio, 495 U.S. 103 (1990). But see Jacobson v.
United States, 503 U.S. 540 (1992)(conviction for receiving child pornography in the mall
overturned where defendant, the target of a government "sting" operation, was entrapped
into the purchase).
33. United States v. Thomas, 74 F.3d 701 (6th Cir. 1996). Mark L. Gordon & Diana J.P.
McKenzie, A Lawyer's Roadmap of the Information Superhighway, 2 J. MARSHALL J. CoNI-
PUTER & INFO. L 177,203 (1995).
34. The materials "depicted images of bestiality, oral sex, incest, sado-masochistic
abuse, and sex scenes involving urination." Thomas, 74 F.3d at 705.
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arguably obscene materials portends that the applicable community
standards will be those espoused by the most priggish among us."
Another recent case demonstrates the power of the Internet to sub-
ject individuals to criminal prosecution. 6 A University of Michigan
student, Baker, communicating with an unidentified person through e-
mail, expressed an escalating sexual interest in violence against women
and girls. Baker was charged under federal law with transmitting threats
to injure or kidnap another, but the court granted his motion to quash the
indictment on the grounds that these private e-mail communications did
not constitute statutory threats. 7
Above and beyond existing judicial decisions and state laws, Con-
gress has decided to criminalize Internet dissemination of not only
obscene material, but all sexually explicit text or images. The Commu-
nications Decency Act of 1996 regulates the carriage and transmission
of "indecent" materials on the Internet to persons under the age of
eighteen. In this Act, designed to protect minors, Congress defines as
indecent "any comment, request, suggestion, proposal, image or other
communication that describes, in terms patently offensive as measured
by contemporary community standards, sexual or excretory activities or
organs.'33
The Communications Decency Act has provoked reaction both swift
and strong. America Online threatened to terminate its bulletin boards
and chat rooms, opining that only through such severe measures could
AOL assure compliance with the Act." The Citizens Empowerment
Coalition filed suit challenging the constitutionality of the Act, as did
the American Civil Liberties Union. Both groups alleged that the Inter-
net is a unique communications medium that merits unique First
Amendment protection at least as broad as that afforded to print media.
The challengers argued that parents are the best judges of material that
35. See also Samarajiva, Cybercontent Regulation, supra note 24.
36. United States v. Baker, 890 F. Supp. 1375 (E.D.Mich. 1995).
37. Baker also posted to an Internet newsgroup, alt.sex.stories, a story that graphically
described the torture, rape and murder of a woman, who was designated by the name of one
of Baker's classmates at Michigan. This story was the basis for a superseded indictment, but
was not mentioned by the Government in the later indictment that was the subject of this
case. Id. The court declared:
While new technology such as the Internet may complicate analysis and may
sometimes require new or modified laws, it does not in this instance qualitatively
change the analysis under the statute or under the First Amendment. Whatever
Baker's faults, and he is to be faulted, he did not violate 18 U.S.C. § 875(c).
Id. at 1390-91.
38. 47 U.S.C.A. § 609 et seq (1996).
39. Leslie Miller, New Law May Silence On-Line Chat, AOL Says, USA TODAY, Apr. 2,
1996, Life, at 6D.
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is appropriate for themselves and their children. A federal judge granted
a preliminary injunction against enforcement of the Act, and a three-
judge federal court agreed that the portions of the Act that attempt to
regulate non-obscene communications do not pass constitutional mus-
ter.' The case is currently before the Supreme Court of the United
States of America and a decision should come down sometime in 1997.
Subversive Advocacy. Intentional incitement, or subversive advo-
cacy, is a special case that illustrates the Court's approach to appraising
the validity of content-based regulations. The Court permits regulation
of expression that qualifies as incitement only if, as a consequence of
the utterance, there exists a genuine likelihood of imminent unlawful
conduct, and if the speaker intends this result.4' Brandenburg v. Ohio
42
declares a general First Amendment tenet that advocacy of even the
most alarming notions is absolutely protected against direct criminal
prohibition, regardless of dangerousness and intent. Interdiction of ideas
or perspectives deemed intrinsically dangerous-and perhaps justifiably
so-by government is forbidden.
B. National Enforcement and International Structures
As we have established, the Internet, even if global in scope, is not
an absolutist free speech domain, but is instead subject to innumerable
national restrictions. At the same time, the very structure of the Net sub-
stantially diminishes the chances for enforcement of national
regulations.4
National speech restrictions can be enforced directly only within the
territory to which they apply.44 But the Net is global, and so is the flow
of information. People who disseminate information through the Net
that is illegal in one country can easily transfer their operations to a
40. American Civil Liberties Union v. Reno, 929 F. Supp. 824 (E.D. Pa. June 11, 1996).
See Shakespeare, Bible Restricted?, COMMUNICATIONS DAILY, March 25, 1996, at 4; Amer-
ica Online Says Censors in Some Cases, Reuters Financial Service, Apr. 1, 1996; Matt
Godbey, Internet "Smut" Law Challenged, PENNSYLVANIA LAW WEEKLY, Apr. 1, 1996,
State Court Rulings, at 12; Richard Gehr et. al., Best of the Net, THE VILLAGE VOICE, Apr. 2,
1996, Cyber, at 21.
41. Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969).
42. 1d.
43. "The on-line world's lack of respect for state and national borders is making a
mockery of outdated laws." Attempts to erect national barriers against subversive or cultur-
ally-polluting information are readily circumvented. On-Line Boundaries Unclear: Internet
Tramples Legal Jurisdictions, COAPUTERWoRLD, June 5, 1995, News, at 1.
44. However, the United States has occasionally, and with some degree of success, ex-
tended its territorial reach. For example, in United States v. Alvarez-Machain, 504 U.S. 655
(1992), the Supreme Court upheld the United States' assertion of jurisdiction over a Mexican
national who had been forcibly kidnapped and brought to the United States to stand trial for
the murder of a Drug Enforcement Agent in Mexico.
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country with no similar prohibitions and effectively reorganize their
disseminating action in matters of hours.
For the recipients of such information, redeployment is hardly no-
ticeable in an environment dominated by the World Wide Web where
information is accessed and retrieved by simply clicking on information
links. Because distance from or location of information sources within
the World Wide Web is irrelevant to the recipient, access to the relo-
cated information sources is easy and straightforward. Already there
exist numerous examples of exiled political groups taking advantage of
information infrastructure networks located in countries with regulatory
environments more sympathetic to their cause to widely disseminate
political information to countries with more restrictive speech and in-
formation regulations. Chinese human rights activists use the World
Wide Web to advocate for their cause,45 and Tibetan women in exile
castigate the Chinese government for its treatment of their sisters still in
Tibet.4 CAPA, an organization that supports Cubans fleeing their coun-
try and delivers accounts on their rescue and survival can be found on
the Web, as well as solidarity pages for the Tupac Amaru hostage takers
in Peru47, while German Nazis use American and Canadian Web sites to
discuss fascism and to issue denials of the Holocaust, a crime under the
German Penal Code.4
Information sources need not necessarily be redeployed for
information to be disseminated across porous national borders. Other tools
are available on the global Net to channel information in order to obscure
its source and place of origin. Anonymous remailers allow electronic
45. Support Democracy in China <http:/lchristusrex.orglwwwllsdcl sdchome.html>.
46. Statement of the Tibetan Women's Delegation Fourth World Conference on Women,
NGO Forum 95 Huairou, China-September 2, 1995 <http:ll www.grannyg.bc.ca/tibet/
tibetpr3.html>.
47 See, e.g., The official Tupac Amaru Homepage can be found at
<http:llwww.cybercity.dklusers/ccc17427>, for an US Tupac Amaru Solidarity Page, see
<http://burn.ucsd.edu/-ats/ mrta.htm>. For an Italian one see <http://vivaldi.nexus.itl
commerceltmcrew/news/mrtal.htm>.
48. The Institute for Historical Review, an organization denying the Holocaust, is pres-
ent on the WWW through a server in the United States. Its internet offerings include
"Auschwitz myths and facts" and "What is a Holocaust denial?" and include outrageous
quotes presented in a quasi-scientific context. The Stormfront magazine is a fascist publica-
tion operating servers in the United States and Canada. It maintains the White Nationalist
Resource Page and contains explicit references to notorious Nazi Gary Lauck. Lauck has
used electronic and conventional mail to massively disseminate Nazi propaganda in Ger-
many. He was arrested in Denmark while on a lecture tour and later extradited to Germany,
where he is currently awaiting trial for violation of the German Penal Code prohibiting na-
tional socialist propaganda. Other web sites include The White Nationalist Page and the
Counter-Revolutionary Resource Page. Electronic mailing lists are available a well. For
extensive information, see Schrdder, supra note 20, at 41 and see also Maier-Rabler, supra
note 1, at 72.
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information to be stripped off all it identifying bits and sent without
attribution to any recipient.4 ' Together with widely available tools of
public key encryption," remailers allow worldwide electronic
communication on a totally anonymous level, thus circumventing any
national attempts at speech regulation.
Continued information redeployment will eventually shape and re-
shape the global information infrastructure. Nations with little speech
regulation or inefficient enforcement structures will attract vast quanti-
ties of data and information illegal in other countries. The global
infrastructure will experience sustained economic pressures similar to
those experienced on the high seas by the "flags of convenience" phe-
nomenon. By redeploying their fleets under "flags of convenience,"
shipping companies essentially forced countries to deregulate.51 A simi-
lar phenomenon could materialize on the Net. Some countries might
evolve into booming "data havens", while others might face a choice
between economic hardship and relinquishing their speech constraints,
thus compromising their national or civic values.
I. CONSEQUENCES
In the world of a global information infrastructure, an escalating
national de jure regulation of speech meets a similarly pervasive de
facto futility of enforcement. Herein, indeed, lies a strange paradox: the
international dimension of the information infrastructure both strength-
ens and weakens speech regulation and free speech protection
simultaneously.
Given this paradox, national legislatures might continue to enact
regulations, but their regulatory endeavors are unlikely to be as effec-
tively enforceable as they desire. To circumvent the limitations of
national regulatory attempts, one might advocate for an international
regulatory measure to restrict the content of Internet communications.
In principle, of course, a global phenomenon like the Internet should
49. The most well-known anonymous remailer is operated without charge by Johan
Helsingius in Finland. His remailer can be reached at anon.penet.fi. A Usenet discussion
group on remailers can be found at alt.privacy.anon-server; see Andre Bacard, Anonymous
Remailer FAQ <http://www.well.com/user/abacard/remail.html>.
50. David Chaum, Achieving Electronic Privacy, Sci. Ai., Aug. 1992, at 96-101.
51. "Flags of convenience" defines a situation where registration of foreign-owned and
foreign-controlled vessels is permitted by certain countries under conditions that are con-
venient and opportune for the registrant. Flags of convenience have been variously referred
to as "flags of necessity," "cheap flags," and "free flags." R. Tali Epstein, Should the Fair
Labor Standards Act Enjoy Extraterritorial Application? A Look At the Unique Case of
Flags of Convenience, 13 U. PA. J. INT'L Bus. L. 653, 655 (1993).
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propel nations to achieve international regulatory cooperation and part-
nership.
Although national legislatures differ dramatically in the kind of
content they prefer to regulate, any attempt to regulate the global infor-
mation infrastructure must be acceptable to the vast majority of nations
in order to become enforceable. Hence, any method or tool to devise a
framework for an internationally acceptable and enforceable content-
based speech restriction must conform to a rigorous set of requirements.
Cognizant of the specific structural qualities of global information infra-
structures, we posit several such essential requirements.52
The Net is a global phenomenon, thus any feasible regulatory at-
tempt should be based on an internationally acceptable, or already
accepted, principle. While speech has never enjoyed-and will never
enjoy-absolute protection, the principle of freedom of speech has be-
come part of a minimum standard of freedoms among a majority of
nations. Therefore, a method should be devised for defining certain
categories of speech that will be subject to regulation, while at the same
time staunchly protecting all speech not within these categories. Essen-
tially, regulatory lines should be drawn circumspectly, so that only
speech that is encompassed within certain specified and narrow confines
can be regulated on the basis of its content. All speech outside these nar-
row boundaries should be assiduously sheltered from content-based
regulation.
Even more important, the method for selecting categories of speech
subject to regulation should ensure results that will be accepted by the
community of nations. The method should thus include a mechanism for
reaching a broad international consensus. This consensus should be multi-
national in its reach, and hence avoid vulnerability to chauvinistic national
interests or sentiments. Shifting attitudes in one nation should not alter the
overall definitional landscape of what is offensive or outrageous.
The mechanism should also be multi-cultural in scope, in order to
circumvent any charges of cultural imperialism, and to stimulate cross-
cultural exchanges of ideas. Moreover, this consensus, broad and
52. Consuelo Lauda Kertz & Lisa Boardman Bumette, Telemarketing Tug-of-War: Bal-
ancing Telephone Information Technology and the First Amendment with Consumer
Protection and Privacy, 43 SYRACUSE L. REv. 1029, 1053-55 (1992). To be effective, any
regulation of speech-on the net, as well as In conventional communicative forums-must
focus on the party who disseminates the communicative act. Attempts to focus on the party
that delivers or receives the message have proven to be ineffective, cumbersome or plain
wrong in the past, and no necessity dictates a resurrection of such plans. For example, a
telephone carrier is not culpable for a fraudulent 900-service transmitted, and media are not
responsible for the accuracy or good faith of advertisements carried unless the publisher
undertakes to guarantee the soundness of the advertisement or the product it describes.
Pittman v. Dow Jones & Co., Inc., 662 F. Supp. 921, 922 (E.D. La. 1987).
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inclusive in concept, should be behavioral in character. Nations should
deem themselves bound by the dictates of this consensus, and should
adhere their conduct to it. Only if such a consensus is already
experienced throughout the world by the vast majority of nations, can
we expect the world to accept it in the telecommunications domain as
well.
Creating a general principle and agreeing on it internationally will
prove to be difficult, if not outright impossible. Thus, we suggest use of
an already-existing international legal principle as a basis for a method-
ology on which to structure a regulatory mechanism.
The international law concept of jus cogens might provide such a
potential basis for regulating speech content on the Net. Jus cogens is
linked to the conception of International Law envisioned by its founding
father, the well-known Dutch jurist Huig de Grotius, in 1625. 5' Grotius
theorized that nations were not conducting their affairs in chaos, devoid
of any underlying universal principles. Grotius was convinced that
without binding rules of international conduct-a common law among
nations that binds them-interactions between nations would be impos-
sible. Grotius traced these norms to natural law principles, and
envisioned these principles functioning as a set of mutual links tying
nations togetherY4
Since Grotius, many jurists and writers have accepted and reaf-
firmed the principle of such binding international law norms.55 Almost
60 years ago, Verdross was the first to advance a coherent view of the
relationship betweenjus cogens and other sources of International law.56
Verdross suggested that the concept of jus cogens would be consistent
with other international law norms only if international treaties violating
jus cogens norms would be void. Thus, Verdross' conception of jus co-
gens creates in essence yet another layer of international law above and
beyond treaty law and customary international law. International law
violating such peremptory norms is void, similar to national laws that
violate the national constitution. 7
53. Cornelius F. Murphy, Jr., The Grotian Vision of World Order, 76 AM. J. INT''L L.
477 (1982).
54. Id. at 480.
55. See Mayer-Sch6nberger & Foster, supra note 5, at 90-96 (extensive discussion of
the jus cogens doctrine).
56. Alfred von Verdross, Forbidden Treaties in International Law, 31 AM. J. INT'L L.
571 (1937).
57. In 1945, the concept ofjus cogens was applied and extended in the Nuremberg trial
of major war criminals. Steven Fogelson, Note, The Nuremberg Legacy: An Unfilled Prom-
ise, 63 S. CAL. L. REv. 833 (1990). The Allied court not only concluded that Germany had
violated peremptory norms of International Law, but also extended the concept ofjus cogens
from the realm of states to the level of the individual. Louis B. Sohn, The New International
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In 1969, the precept ofjus cogens was incorporated into the Vienna
Convention on the Law of Treaties." According to leading experts of
vastly disparate legal, political, and cultural backgrounds, the issue of
whetherjus cogens is accepted is now settled. 9
The Vienna Convention defines jus cogens as follows:
[A] norm accepted and recognized by the international commu-
nity of States as a whole as a norm from which no derogation is
permitted and which can be modified only by a subsequent
norm of general International law having the same character.'
Thus, jus cogens, gleaned from verifiable behavior across the com-
munity of nations, structurally fulfills the methodological requisites we
posit, and offers the potential for achieving the necessary substantive
consensus in the global telecommunications arena. As a "peremptory
norm of international law,' 61 jus cogens represents a corpus of interna-
tional law rules that are binding upon every nation and every people. It
comprises by definition the multicultural and multinational consensus
that we assert is essential. Jus cogens norms mandate that certain forms
of behavior are unequivocally intolerable.
This global consensus commends jus cogens norms as the touch-
stone for identifying types of speech that are amenable to an
internationally acceptable content-based regulation. However, we sug-
gest here that-especially given the scope and power of the Net-a
Law: Protection of the Rights of Individuals Rather than States, 32 Mi. U. L. REv. 1 (1982).
See Charter of the International Military Tribunal in TRIAL OF THE MAJOR WAR CRMINALS
BEFORE THE INTERNATIONAL MILITARY TRIBuNAL (Andronicus Pub. Co. 1946) 11.
Since Nuremberg, jus cogens prohibits not only states from engaging in certain conduct,
but also holds individuals accountable for conduct that violates jus cogens. The Nuremburg
Legacy, 63 S. CAL. L. REV. at 868-870. See also Articles 7 & 8, Charter of the International
Military Tribunal (1946). This acceptance of peremptory norms of International Law is the
significant legacy of the Nuremberg trials, and since Nuremburg, jus cogens has become a
widely accepted mainstream principle. The Nuremburg Legacy, 63 S. CAL. L. REv. at 883.
58. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, 63 AM. J. INT'L L. 875 (1969), signed
and ratified to date by 48 nations. During the drafting process, 43 out of 44 nations com-
mented positively on the proposed jus cogens regulation. Comments by Governments, ILC
Reports on 2nd part of its 17th Session and on its 18th Session, General Assembly, 21st
Session, Official Records, Supp. No. 9 (A/6309/Rev.1), Annex.
59. For the Socialist view, see Geoffrey Hazard, Book Review of Aleksidze, Some
Theoretical Problems of International Law: Peremptory Norms: Jus Cogens, 78 Am. J. Int'l
L. 248 (1984); for a western view, see W. Paul Gormley, The Right to Life and the Rule of
Non-Derogability: Peremptory Norms of Jus Cogens, THE RIGHT TO LIFE IN INTERNA-
TIONAL LAW (B.G. Ramcharan ed., 1985). For a general treatise of jus cogens see LAURI
HANNIKAINEN, PEREMPTORY NoIhis IN INTERNATIONAL LAW (Finnjish Lawyers Pub. Co.
1988).
60. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, May 23, 1969, art. 53, 1155 U.N.T.S.
331, reprinted in 8 I.L.M. 679 (1969).
61. Mayer-Schnberger and Foster, supra note 5, p. 90-96.
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paradigm shift is appropriate. Not only can speech that incites behavior
condemned by jus cogens principles be regulated, but also speech that
advocates conduct thatjus cogens terms depraved can be banned, should
a nation desire a broader ban. To be sure, the varieties of speech subject
to regulation under a jus cogens-based system would be few and nar-
row: only speech that advocated clearly reprehensible behavior, e.g.,
piracy, slavery, genocide, apartheid, aggressive warfare, terrorism, and
torture, could be constraindd.62
Because ajus cogens-based approach narrows the parameters for re-
strictions to the common denominator among the community of nations,
this approach avoids the constant danger of cultural imperialism. It also
averts the impulsive, ultimately devastating reflexes that characterize
national majoritarianism. As such, jus cogens is uniquely qualified to
serve as a methodology for regulating globally connected information
infrastructures.
Defining the substantive categories of speech to be regulated is the
first step. But no regulation will be effective without a working en-
forcement strategy. Because the information infrastructure is global, so
must be the enforcement. The international instrument that implements
the jus cogens approach to regulation of speech on the information in-
frastructure must address the enforcement issue. Reciprocal extension of
the principle of territoriality among the state parties and the broadening
and strengthening of international criminal law and its procedural as-
pects can be a first level for addressing the area of enforcement. 6'
But the objectives of an international agreement are even broader in
scope. State parties must recognize the importance of speedy national
implementation and rigorous enforcement of the internationally agreed
regulations. Moreover, state parties need to execute and implement an
enforcement mechanism among them to guarantee continued national
support for such an agreement. 64
International consultative organizations with existing substantial
factual knowledge of the matters at issue, such as the Organization for
Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), could facilitate dis-
cussions and negotiations leading up to such an international agreement.
62. Id. at 97-102.
63. For example, The Genocide Convention of 1948, 78 U.N.T.S. 227, has been ratified
by more than 100 nations. Persons charged with genocide, an offense against the community
of nations, can be tried by any nation.
64. A possible, albeit dramatic, consequence of continuous, open and systematic non-
enforcement of the international agreement by one nation could be the restriction of access
for information flows from that country, or by that particular government. For example,
these domains could be temporarily disabled in the network domain name files.
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Ill. CONCLUSION
Regulating the content of speech on the Net is still thought of as a
national issue. Free speech absolutists and national legislators discuss
these matters without considering the international dimension of the
information infrastructure, which diminishes the significance of these
national debates.
The international aspect of the information infrastructure places
unique, albeit unexpected and largely unrecognized, constraints upon
both free speech advocates and regulators. The former must come to
terms with the fact that the global Net is not an anarchic medium, above
and beyond legal restrictions, but on the contrary, is cluttered with nu-
merous-even contradictory-national speech regulations. On the other
hand, national regulators must recognize that domestic controls and en-
forcement are futile regulatory mechanisms for an international
structure in which information can be redeployed and disseminated in a
matter of seconds.
Only an international perspective can overcome the current short-
sightedness of free speech absolutists and regulators alike. Speech
restrictions on the Net must be elevated to the international level to be
both subjectively acceptable to the world's nations and globally en-
forceable. An international legal instrument, jus cogens, which by
definition embodies this global consensus and positively binds all na-
tions, could provide a useful tool in drafting a possible solution. Jus
cogens, limiting regulation to specific, defined areas such as advocacy
of genocide, slavery, torture, or apartheid, together with creative inter-
national enforcement structures might facilitate the creation of speech
regulations that are both sensible and feasible.
